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Abstract 
  This working paper evaluates the effect of military expenditure on development in 77 countries 
from different regions and income groups. In this endeavour, we use a baseline fixed-effects 
panel data model, the Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) methodology and an 
instrumental variable (IV) estimation in order to control for endogeneity. The paper also runs 
robustness checks through several model extensions and spinoffs, and uses a gravity model 
augmented with the number of bilateral conflict casualties to verify the IV exclusion condition 
through the channel of trade. Initially, the results show a negative correlation between the 
military burden and development. This downward influence is most robust in low-income 
countries; it gradually dissipates as the income level of the country increases. Our findings 
suggest that when military spending is merely linked to conflicts and counterproductive imports 
of weapons, its macroeconomic influence spirals further downward. There is also evidence of a 
potential offsetting combination of positive economic spill-overs (e.g. stable political situation, 
defence offset contracts, productivity-improving military research programmes) and negative 
crowding out effects (e.g. less civilian public investment, non-productive military imports) 
among middle- and high-income countries.  
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 I. INTRODUCTION 
  Conventional wisdom states that warfare is the opposite of prosperity and growth. However, this 
axiomatic statement should not remain beyond doubt or examination, especially that the amount 
dedicated to military spending worldwide has been constantly increasing and its proportion has 
been kept significantly high within most government budgets1. The question of the defence-
growth nexus is particularly urgent for countries that suffer from significant infrastructure and 
human development shortages, and are therefore believed to be constantly facing a trade-off 
between security and growth/development whenever it comes to military spending.  
  This paradigm was first challenged by Benoit (1973, 1978), who examined the case of 44 LDCs 
using a cross-section data. The main finding, known as the Benoit Hypothesis, was that defence 
expenditure does actually have an upward influence on GDP growth. Since then, the literature 
have been divided, and several studies that followed gave different results depending on the 
analysed countries, the time periods and the econometric approaches. Subsequently, literature 
shows an absence of consensus whether in terms of impact on GDP growth or development 
[Dunne et al. (2005)]. Theoretically, this could be explained by the existence of different 
transmission channels for the interrelation between defence spending and income dynamics. 
These channels often have conflicting effects. The latter can be grouped into three main 
categories: demand effects, supply effects and security provision effects. Depending on which 
effects are considered, the outcome is likely to be different across studies. 
  This lack of consensus was exacerbated by sporadic choices of countries. Most previous papers 
either use a single-country time-series study or a panel data model that includes all countries as 
one entity. In the first case, the power of estimation is questionable, especially when using short 
data; a weak external validity is quasi-inevitable, considering that each country or group of 
countries supposedly has different idiosyncrasies. In the second case, treating all countries as one 
unit leads back to ignoring the aforementioned idiosyncrasies, thereby not enabling cross-country 
comparison.  
                                                            
1
 From 1988 to 2018, the world military expenditure went from 1.5 to 1.82 trillion USD in constant terms 
[Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2018)] 
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  In light of the examples presented in the literature review below, a sound comparison between 
countries seems improbable and examining different single countries or panels could yield 
different implications, particularly if the periods or the methodologies are unalike. Even within 
the same country, results differ depending on the adopted methodology. These issues are taken 
into consideration in our research to a fair extent, mainly by classifying countries based on 
income and geographic location, and by treating each group separately. 
  Another shortcoming of the current literature is linked to endogeneity and reverse causality. 
However, a few recent studies tried to cover this aspect, like Chen et al. (2014) who use for 
causality assessment purposes the two-step GMM techniques developed by Arellano and Bond 
(1991) with a bivariate panel VAR system. However, the control for endogeneity is confined to 
the use of country fixed-effects, which cannot effectively account for whether a country is in 
conflict. Rather, the conflict-related variable might actually hold a significant explanatory power. 
Febermayr et al. (2014) provide further insight on this methodological issue in even different 
areas, such as trade agreements. They argue in favour of the instrumental variable approach as a 
sound alternative that can also reduce reverse causality risks. 
  This study fits in this framework. It examines the relationship between military spending and 
development (which we proxy with GDP per capita) in 77 countries from different regions and 
income groups, and controls for endogeneity through an instrumental variable approach. In the 
latter, we use the variable battle-related deaths, which implicitly enables to control for the 
existence of a deadly conflict as well.  
  In our endeavour to explore the aforementioned nexus, we motivate two main hypotheses. The 
first hypothesis states that in low-income countries, where development shortages are the most 
severe and defence spending is merely linked to counterproductive expenses and imports of 
military equipment, the influence of military spending is supposed to be negative. Acting as the 
observe of hypothesis 1, the second hypothesis indicates that when defence expenditure is linked 
to some extent to technology transfer, R&D, production and investment in infrastructure, the 
industrial and commercial spillovers are likely to boost income development and income growth. 
  In order to examine this question and test these hypotheses, we initially use a baseline fixed-
effects panel data model. Then, the abovementioned instrumental variable is introduced to reduce 
endogeneity and to provide robustness verification. In order to explore the validity of the nexus 
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depending on the countries, we break the panel into different subpanels based on economic 
characteristics and category of each group of countries, namely income and geography. As an 
additional robustness exercise, we pool the overall panel and include income-based dummy 
variables. By the end of this research, different extensions are presented, where key variables like 
GFCF and the military burden are replaced respectively by private investment and proportion of 
military personnel. The objective of the extensions is to offer further insights on crowding out 
effects depending on both the source (military investment versus staffing budget) and the target 
(overall investment versus private capital spending). 
  The interest of this study first comes from the use of subpanels based on income and geography 
to provide a deeper insight into the relationship between the variables of interest. Additionally, 
while most studies do not deepen the analysis to deliver a narrative of the factors explaining the 
different results, one of this paper’s fortes is providing historical background and geopolitical 
analysis, in an attempt to illustrate what appears to be purely statistical results.  
  Another novelty is the use of a gravity model that is augmented with interstate conflict-related 
deaths to detect the impact of the latter on trade flows, and by extension on GDP. Furthermore, 
the gravity model is estimated using the Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood, which answers the 
criticism addressed by Santos-Silva & Tenreyro (2006) and Liu (2009) to most gravity models as 
regards to inconsistent results because of heteroscedasticity, truncation of panels and failure to 
capture the extensive margin.  
  Our findings challenge the seminal Benoit hypothesis, initially inducted based on LDC data. The 
negative correlation between the military burden and development in low-income countries is 
strongly robust through all different model estimates. Moreover, the choice of battle-related 
deaths as an instrumental variable showed to be best suitable for low-income countries, where the 
exogeneity condition is robust.  
  One of the extensions also provide hints on an interesting fact, i.e. staffing does not crowd out 
growth and development, as opposed to equipment expenditure. 
  In terms of policy, one major recommendation would be the improvement of the productivity of 
low-income countries’ military investments, in light of their robust negative macroeconomic 
through all model varieties and spinoffs. One way of doing so could be by introducing industrial 
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offset contracts in defence procurement in order to insure a channel of technology transfer and 
investment, like middle- and high-income countries. This aspect is important considering that 
none of the low-income countries examined in this study adopts such measures. 
  This research work initiates the analysis with a literature discussion in section II, followed by a 
detailed explanation of the methodology and the data in section III. The results of the different 
models and their extensions are analysed in section IV. Section V concludes and states the limits 
of this research exercise and potential topics to cover in future research. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
  The study of the nexus between defence and growth or development is considered as a niche 
area of research compared to other disciplines in economics. However, several studies have 
contributed to the debate on the impact of defence expenditure in different countries using 
various econometric methodologies.  
  The interest towards this topic rose after the seminal work of Benoit (1973, 1978), who found a 
positive influence of defence expenditure on GDP growth in the case of 44 least developing 
countries (LDC) from 1950 to 1965. This finding, known as the Benoit Hypothesis, raised several 
questions and eyebrows, and compelled several economists to dig into this subject. Whereas, in 
light of the absence of a unanimous theoretical or econometric framework, the literature still 
shows no consensus [Dunne et al. (2005)].  
  From the outset, the absence of consensus could be tributary to the existence of different 
transmission channels for the interrelation between defence spending and income dynamics. 
These channels often have conflicting effects. Dunne (1996) and Smith (2000) group them into 
three broad categories: demand effects, supply effects and security provision effects. The first 
category is based, on one hand, on the Keynesian multiplier effect where an increase in military 
expenditure raises demand and, in the case of underemployment, improves the use of resources. 
On the other hand, the government faces a trade-off when wielding military spending because 
any excess could generate crowding-out effects. The second category of channels is tightly linked 
to competition between technology and the factors of production. In other words, military-driven 
positive technological spillover effects (if they happen to exist) are competing with the crowding-
out due to shifting factors of production towards military use; the latter are likely to increase 
amidst conscription and ideological fervour, especially during times of geopolitical tension2. The 
third category hinges on providing a propitious and secure environment for markets to operate, as 
the protection of the population and their properties provides strong incentives to invest and 
produce, thereby improving the level of development and income. In this vein, insecurity risk can 
                                                            
2
 Dunne et al. (2005), P. 451. The authors argue that even though resources used by the military are evidently not 
available for civilian use, there still could be externalities such as potential industrial and private spin-offs of military 
research outputs or relative productivity improvements among workers who were trained by the army. This idea is 
backed-up by authors like Deger (1986), who argues that the military could create growth-conducive infrastructures. 
We provide further examples of potential externalities when interpreting the results of the different models in the 
next sections. 
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be considered as an additional cost for investment, production and trade, and military spending 
can help reduce said cost if it is associated with security needs. However, an increasing military 
expenditure that is associated with other objectives such as arms race could deteriorate security 
and generate downward pressure on economic development. 
  Logically, the outcome of the abovementioned channels (and their combination) will depend on 
the proportion of each ingredient, how the military budget is funded, the extent to which military 
research produces exploitable technology, etc. This implies that the results are bound to differ 
across countries and depending on the period. Ergo, the emphasis should be laid on the 
idiosyncrasies of each country or category of countries during each period, for a comprehensive 
analysis.  
  This last point indicates another reason for the absence of consensus in the military economics 
literature. Several studies either opt for time-series modelling to analyse one single country, or a 
panel data methodology that includes all countries as one entity. Smith (1977, 1980) explores the 
case of OECD countries using time series and cross-section data. In both papers, he ascertains the 
existence of crowding-out effects driven by military spending on investment, which implies a 
negative effect on GDP growth and development through the demand effects channel as defined 
by Dunne (1996), and explained above. A different channel is explored by Daddi et al. (2018), 
who estimate a nonlinear growth model using data from Italy. Their model suggests that 
peacekeeping expenditure is the main component (of defence budget) that drives a positive 
macroeconomic effect since it supposedly reduces insecurity at home, which fits in the third 
category of channels we presented above in this section. In the case of a middle-income country, 
Üçler (2016) finds a positive relationship in Turkey for the 1975-2014 period, but no significant 
causality from defence expenditure based on the Hacker-Hatemi-J bootstrap causality test. 
  Gold (1997) uses the same econometric framework as Smith’s (ibid.) for the case of USA in the 
1949-1988 period. His results confirm military expenditure’s crowding-out effects, but through 
private consumption rather than investment. This is supported by a more recent study by Pieroni 
(2009) specifically for US private consumption addressed to services and medical care. Lorusso 
and Pieroni (2017) also detect a negative correlation between output (through private 
consumption) and military spending using both a vector autoregressive estimation (VAR) and a 
new Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model (DSGE) for the 1960-2013 period 
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in the US. However, for the same country, different results are put forward by Atesoglu (2004) 
using a different methodology; for the 1947-2001 period, no evidence of crowding-out is 
detected. Another example of contradiction is from Israel, where Cohen et al. (1996) discover 
using time series, that defence spending has an upward influence on output growth through 
private investment. Contrariwise, a study by Derouen (2000) using a non-linear production model 
shows that when military expenditure is raised by 1%, the economic activity in Israel actually 
decreases (-0.037%).  
  In light of the examples shown so far, a sound comparison between countries seems improbable 
and examining different single countries or panels could yield different implications, particularly 
if the period or the methodology is unalike. Even within the same country, results differ 
depending on the adopted methodology. 
  As hinted above, the methodologies also seem to play a substantial role in influencing the 
outcomes of research in the literature. The absence of theoretical unanimity on how to model the 
military burden and growth/development nexus contributes to this diversity3. Econometric 
approaches used to explore this nexus include cross-section regressions [Galvin (2003)], fixed-
effects panel data [Kollias et al. (2007)], Stroup and Heckelman (2001)], Granger causality test 
Joerding (1986)], panel VAR system [Chen et al. (2014), Lorusso and Pieroni (2017)], time-
series models [Malizard (2015), Klein (2004)], among a few others. 
  In order to overcome some of these challenges, some economists tried to cover larger number of 
countries and to group them into different panels based on similarity in terms of characteristics, 
mainly based on income and geography. In this framework, Chen et al. (2014) cover 137 
countries for the period 1988-2005. The authors criticise methodological limitations that 
characterised previous research work, namely the low explanatory power of estimations based on 
relatively short periods in single country studies and the risks of endogeneity related to static 
panel model. Instead, they suggest an alternative approach using the dynamic panel GMM model 
introduced by Wooldridge (2001) combined with a two-step estimator, which is argued to 
account for potential endogeneity and, importantly, the interrelationship defence-growth. The 
causality is measured within different sub-panels based on income and geographic location, 
instead of treating different countries as one entity. 
                                                            
3
 This point is further explained in the first part of Section III below.  
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  Despite the continuous progress in research in defence economics, there are still substantial 
methodological shortcomings and risks. For instance, the bulk of literature does not control for 
whether a country is at war or undergoes a risk of conflict due to regional tensions with 
neighbouring countries for instance. Here, when a negative correlation (notwithstanding the 
causality direction) is detected, it could be tributary to this omitted variable. A conflict can 
actually be at the origin of both the increase in military spending and the decrease in GDP per 
capita (asset destruction, economic uncertainty…). 
  This risk of endogeneity and omitted variable bias is quite significant, especially when 
considering, for instance, that in the low-income countries sample chosen by Chen et al. (ibid.) 
(where a negative causality between income and defence spending was found), 14 countries had 
been in conflict (low/very low state of peace) and 16 were at medium risk of conflict4. On the 
other hand, among the 33 high-income countries in the same study –where the sign of causality is 
positive-, 23 (i.e. 69.7%) are highly ranked in terms of state of peace. It is worth mentioning that 
this source of endogeneity cannot simply be treated by only using country fixed-effects as Chen 
et al. (ibid.) had insinuated, because the conflict-related variable might actually hold a significant 
explanatory power. Febermayr et al. (2014) provide further insight on this methodological 
argument in even different areas, such as trade agreements. The latter authors argue in favour of 
the instrumental variable approach as a sound alternative in this context that can also reduce 
reverse causality risks, apart from the lag-based IVs that are systematically used within the GMM 
model. 
  Our research work fits in this particular framework. We suggest the number of battle-related 
deaths as an instrumental variable for the military burden. The Combat-related deaths instrument 
axiomatically enables to control for the existence of conflict, and offers more information than a 
conflict dummy variable would. In order to verify the IV exclusion condition, we use an 
augmented gravity model that includes bilateral combat-related deaths, in order to evaluate 
whether the latter affects trade flows –and by ricochet GDP per capita as a proxy for 
development. 
                                                            
4
 Own calculations, based on the Global Peace Index (GPI) by The Institute of Economics and Peace, for the period 
from 2012 to 2019. 
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  The next section provides insight on this methodology and further explains the choice of 
variables and data. 
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III. ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
  Studies use several different variables depending on the objective and prism through which the 
nexus of military expenditure and economic growth/development is considered. A few studies 
took inspiration from the growth model developed by Barro (1990), which enables to capture, via 
a production function, the potential influence of various tax-funded public expenditure on GDP. 
However, said growth model usually generates non-significant coefficients for military 
expenditure, and government spending in general, which is explained by the omission of 
explanatory variables and the existence of non-linearity [Aizenman and Glick (2003), Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin (1995)].  
  Thereupon, economists have been adding different supplementary exogenous variables. In this 
frame, Aizenman and Glick (2003) include hostile external threats, which are proxied by a 
weighted average of the number of wars and adversaries against whom a country has been 
involved in conflict5. For the case of Turkey and Greece, Manamperi (2016) uses a modified 
"Barro style" model, which includes education (secondary school enrolment), population growth 
and GFCF alongside the military expenditure. 
  Other studies used even fewer variables in a panel VAR framework. Here, Chen et al. (2014) 
use, for causality assessment purposes, the two-step GMM techniques developed by Arellano and 
Bond (1991) with a bivariate panel VAR system. The latter merely includes GDP per capita and 
the military burden, with focus on their interrelation.  
  Through the overview of the aforementioned studies among other papers, it is possible to 
conclude that there is no consensus on which control variables to use. This insinuates a margin of 
manoeuvre as long as the methodology shows the required awareness regarding the potential 
influence of other geopolitical and conflict-related factors. 
3.1. The baseline model (Fixed effects regression) 
  For the economic development equation, we use real GDP per capita as a proxy for 
development, since it is so far the most agreed upon measure despite its limits, e.g. the significant 
variance. We follow in our choice of GDP the argument advocated for by seminal work such as 
Lucas’s (1988), where income growth is seen as the main instrument to reach a higher level of 
                                                            
5
 Aizenman and Glick (2003), P. 3 
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wellbeing. Our rationale for avoiding the use of the human development index (HDI) is twofold: 
firstly, the data is not sufficiently available in some of the countries we examine below. 
Secondly, we adopt the criticism in the literature according to which the proxies used within the 
HDI to measure health (life expectancy), education (average number of years of study) and the 
standard of living (per capita GNI) relatively generate the same trends when plotted together with 
real GDP per capita.  
             𝑌𝑖𝑡𝑑 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1. 𝑀𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2. 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑑 + 𝛼3. 𝐼𝑖𝑡𝑑 + 𝛼4. 𝑈𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖𝑌 + 𝜙𝑡𝑌 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡𝑌                   (1) 
  𝑌𝑖𝑡𝑑 is the real GDP per capita expressed in log; 𝑀𝐵𝑖𝑡 is defence expenditure as a proportion of 
GDP (in log); 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑑 represents the log of exports; 𝐼𝑖𝑡𝑑  is the overall investment in log, proxied by 
GFCF; 𝑈𝑖𝑡 is the unemployment rate. 𝜂𝑖𝑌 embodies country-specific effects, while 𝜙𝑡𝑌 represents a 
time-specific effect. The error terms 𝜀𝑖𝑡𝑌  are assumed to follow a distribution similar to normality. 
Level variables are expressed in first difference, in order to treat the unit root and to avoid 
spurious relationships, hence the d term at the end of each. 
  The objective is to explore the influence of military spending on economic development and 
other variables of interest and to discuss potential policy implications, depending on the 
characteristics of the country in terms of income, among others. 
  The inclusion of country-fixed effects aims to control for time-invariant unobservable 
characteristics such as the existence of natural resources, ethnic and religious diversity, and 
historical idiosyncrasies such as whether or not the country was a former colony, etc. As for the 
year-fixed effects, they enable to control for the potential unobservable influence of more global 
phenomena in the 1989-2017 period, such as the early 1990s recession, the international 
repercussions of the Asian financial crisis, the late 2000s recession, as well as temporary political 
alterations.  
  The choice of fixed-effects is based on the Hausman test’s results (shown in Appendix I). The 
test rejects the null hypothesis of the random effect model being appropriate for the GDP per 
capita equation with a chi2 equal to 24.90. 
  In order to explore the validity of the relationship between military spending and development 
depending on the countries, we break the panel into different subpanels based on economic 
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characteristics and category of each group of countries. The different classifications are based on 
the most recent update by the World Bank. The different countries and their income groups are 
listed in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1: List of the examined countries 
LIC [Low-income] LMC [Lower-mid income] 
UMC [Upper-mid 
income] HIC [High-income] 
Burkina Faso Angola Algeria Argentina Ireland 
Chad Bangladesh Armenia Australia Israel 
Eritrea Cambodia Botswana Austria Italy 
Ethiopia Cameroon Bulgaria Bahrain Japan 
Liberia Egypt Colombia Belgium Kuwait 
Malawi Ghana Guatemala Canada Lithuania 
Mali Indonesia Iran Chile Panama 
Mozambique Kenya Iraq Croatia Saudi Arabia 
Niger Mauritania Jordan Cyprus Singapore 
Rwanda Morocco Lebanon Czech Republic Spain 
Senegal Nicaragua Malaysia Denmark Switzerland 
Sierra Leone Nigeria Mexico Finland UAE 
Syria Pakistan Namibia France United Kingdom 
Yemen, Rep. Sudan Peru Germany United States 
Zimbabwe Ukraine Russian Federation Hungary Uruguay 
    South Africa     
    Turkey     
 
3.2. Gravity model, IV approach and Poisson maximum likelihood  
  Pursuant to the criticism addressed in the previous section with regards to the risk of 
endogeneity, omitted variable bias and reverse causality, we estimate equation (1) using an 
instrument variable for military expenditure. 
  The first assumption here is that there is a significant first-stage correlation between conflict-
related deaths and military spending. Secondly, the exclusion restriction should be satisfied, i.e. 
no correlation should exist between conflict-related deaths and GDP per capita. 
  In our case, the first-stage equation can be written as follows: 
      𝑀?̂?𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇0 + 𝜇1. 𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑠 + 𝜙𝑡𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑠                       (2) 
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  The history of wars and conflicts provides substance for the exogeneity of our chosen IV. 
During most wars in the 19th century, military budgets increased substantially. The data is 
conclusive in this regards, and several examples confirm this hypothesis. On the aftermath of a 
failed presidential election in post-communist Angola by the end of 1992, the escalated number 
of battle-related casualties in 1993 (a 419% increase, i.e. 12,054 civilians and fighters) due to 
U.S.-backed rebel organisation UNITA’s offensive on the government, generated a tremendous 
increase in military spending (+2264%). Subsequently, the military burden jumped from 5.68% 
of GDP to 17.52%6. During the Algerian Civil War, the alarmingly deadly attacks by different 
Islamist groups -GIA- against government forces and civilians went together with a continuous 
increase in the military burden, rising from 1.21% of GDP in 1991 to 3.7% in 20027. The same 
logic applies to interstate conflicts such as the Eritrean-Ethiopian war in 1998-2000, or even in 
small clashes, e.g. sporadic ISIS attacks and border clashes targeting Jordan in 2016 and 2017, 
which were accompanied with an increase in the military burden from 4.30% in 2015 to 4.84% 
by the end of 2017. 
   As for the verification of the IV exclusion condition, we use an augmented gravity model that 
includes bilateral conflict-related deaths, in order to evaluate whether the latter affects trade 
flows, and by extension GDP per capita. This approach takes underpinning in the assumption that 
the main channel through which conflict deaths could affect GDP, would be through trade. War 
casualties –no matter how few they could be, are a signal of tension between at least the directly 
involved countries. If said tensions are translated into trade restrictions, this could affect GDP 
[Equation (1)], as the foreign component of the aggregate demand would be affected. In addition, 
trade flows could simply tumble amidst mere security risks related to the existence of a deadly 
conflict. 
  The outcome of the gravity model estimation should also hint on whether or not the exclusion 
restriction applies to investment, if the latter is considered as a dependent variable, since trade 
goes hand in hand with foreign direct investments (FDI) according to an overwhelming number 
of empirical studies [e.g. Büthe and Milner (2008), Fukao et al. (2003)]. In this study, however, 
we do not use investment as a dependent variable. 
                                                            
6
 Author’s calculations based on the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) data. 
7
 Ibid. 1991 is when a military coup cancelled the Islamist electoral victory in the first multi-party parliamentary 
elections since Algeria’s independence. The GIA (Armed Islamic Group) was incapacitated by the year 2002. For 
more details about the conflict, see Hagelstein (2008). 
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  Initially, gravity models are inspired from Isaac Newton’s Law of Gravitation. Their canonical 
form can be expressed like this: 
  𝑋𝑖𝑗 = 𝐺. 𝑌𝑖𝜁1 .𝑌𝑗𝜁2𝑑𝑖𝑗𝜁3 . 𝜔𝑖𝑗            (3) 
  Where 𝑋𝑖𝑗 is the exports movement from country of origin i to country of destination j. 𝑌𝑖 and 𝑌𝑗 
respectively represent the mass of the two economies, measured by GDP. 𝑑𝑖𝑗 accounts for the 
distance between each pair of origin-destination countries. 𝐺 is a gravitational constant, and is 
supposed to account for other potential factors in this canonical version of gravity models. As for 𝜔𝑖𝑗, it is the error term, which is assumed to be log-normally distributed. 
  In case of log-linearization, Equation (3) becomes: 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑋𝑖𝑗 = 𝜁0 + 𝜁1. 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑌𝑖) + 𝜁2. 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑌𝑗) + 𝜁3. 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑑𝑖𝑗) + 𝜀𝑖𝑗  (4) 
With: 𝜁0 = 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐺) ;  𝜀𝑖𝑗 = 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝜔𝑖𝑗) ;  𝜁3 ≤ 0 
  In the present research, we estimate a dynamic version of this model (including time t) that is 
augmented with the number of conflict-related deaths. We also add a number of control variables Ω𝑖𝑗 based on various extensions of the model in the literature [e.g. Rose (2000)]: 
     𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝜁0 + 𝜁1. 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑌𝑖𝑡) + 𝜁2. 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑌𝑗𝑡) + 𝜁3. 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑑𝑖𝑗) + 𝛼. 𝐿𝑜𝑔(Z𝑖𝑗𝑡) +  𝛽. Ω𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗   (5) 
  Here, Z𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the number of (interstate) battle-related casualties. The controls Ω𝑖𝑗 include 
variables that are related to (i) cultural and geographic proximity, via dummy variables for 
contiguity, common colonisers, post-1945 colonial relationship, common religion, and common 
(official) language. The controls also encompass (ii) dummy variables related to free trade 
agreements, common currency and GATT/WTO membership. 
  If the correlation between the number of conflict-driven deaths and exports is found to be 
significant, introducing exports as an explanatory variable in the GDP per capita equation 
(Equation (1)) should enable to isolate and control for the potential effects driven by the number 
of casualties on GDP per capita through trade. 
17 
 
  It is worth emphasising that in the potential presence of heteroscedasticity in the gravity model, 
the nonlinear transformation (e.g. via logarithm) of the variables expressed in equations (4) or (5) 
would most likely generate unreliable results. This econometric problem was first pointed out by 
Santos-Silva and Tenreyro (2006) who argue that a heteroscedastic error term in gravity models 
(𝜔𝑖𝑗 in this case) leads to a linear correlation between its logarithmic form (𝜀𝑖𝑗) and the 
covariates, which would lead to inconsistent estimates of the coefficients8. Even in other non-
gravity models, it is only when there is no linear relationship between the two that an OLS 
estimation of the log-linearized equation can generate the best possible linear approximation9. 
  Log-linearization is also blamable for another significant statistical problem in gravity 
modelling, i.e. the exclusion of the zero observations, thereby failing to capture for example the 
extensive margin of trade [Liu (2009)]. And like in our case, this issue is more probable when 
small countries are considered10. It is even more severe when considering that the number of 
bilateral conflict-related casualties is zero in most cases, and non-zero numbers of deaths are 
usually registered only during a short period of one to three year, e.g. the early 1990s Gulf War 
and several very brief skirmishes between a few Sub-Saharan African countries. Thus, the 
elimination of zero-casualties pairs and zero-trade pairs would lead to the loss of much of the 
model’s expected explanatory power. 
  In order to avoid these problems, we opt for the Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) 
approach with fixed effects, which is robust and properly addresses heteroscedasticity. The 
PPML also effectively handles zeros without any truncation of the panel, as it solves the model 
multiplicatively without any nonlinear transformation. Ergo, it even allows interpreting the 
coefficients as elasticity when combining variables in levels and in logarithms.  
  However, Since it is less suitable in the case of an IV approach, we do not use PPML when 
treating the zero-deaths in the first stage regression in equation (2). Instead, we set the model so 
that the 0 observations in the instrumental variable battle-related deaths can be treated separately. 
As an alternative, we also artificially replace the 0s with 1s to end up with 0s after applying the 
natural logarithm. We opt for the latter approach because of the importance of ultimately keeping 
                                                            
8
 Santos-Silva and Tenreyro (2006), P. 653 
9
 Goldberger (1991), P. 53 
10
 Santos-Silva and Tenreyro (ibid.), P. 643 
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the zeros, since they incarnate information on the non-existence of a casualties-generating 
conflict in the panel.  
  In order to explore the nexus of interest further, we experiment a few spinoffs and extensions of 
both the baseline model and the IV robustness check. Further explanation is given for each in 
section IV below. 
3.3. Variables and data sources 
  In order to estimate equation (1) with fixed-effects and then with the chosen instrumental 
variable [with equation (2)], we make use of data for the aforementioned 77 countries from 1989 
to 2017. Most data comes from the World Development Indicators. For the main regression 
(fixed-effects and IV), the variables are detailed in the following list: 
- The real gross domestic product per capita: we use the constant 2010 USD GDP divided 
by midyear population. As commonly used in the literature, the aggregate is computed 
without deducing the potential depreciation of assets nor the impact on natural resources. 
The data come from the World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National 
Accounts data files. 
- The military burden: it represents the military expenditure as a share of GDP. The data 
encompass current and investment spending on armed forces, defence 
administrations/ministries and government agencies. Military research and space 
programmes are also taken into account. The data are provided by the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Here, we opt for share data (as opposed to 
level data) in order to insure comparability across countries of military budgets and to 
avoid exchange rate conversion problems. This definition is also present in previous 
studies, e.g. Kollias et al. (2004), and Dunne & Perlo-Freeman (2005).  
- Exports: we use the figures in constant 2010 USD of the exports of goods and services to 
the rest of the world. Investment income and transfer payments are excluded. Here also, 
we use World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. 
- Investment: as a proxy of overall investment, we use GFCF in constant 2010 USD terms, 
which includes equipment purchases, the construction of different infrastructures and 
buildings. The data for investment is driven from the World Bank national accounts data. 
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- The unemployment rate: for this variable, we use estimates provided by the International 
Labour Organization (ILOSTAT database). 
- Real interest rate: we use the lending interest rate provided by the International Monetary 
Fund, adjusted for inflation using the GDP deflator taken from the World Bank dataset. A 
caveat here would be the fact that countries could have different terms and conditions 
attached to said rate, which could limit its cross-country comparability. However, since 
this variable is used merely as a control, this risk is deemed marginal. 
- Private investment: the proxy for this variable is the private sector’s contribution to GFCF 
(in % of GDP), as defined by the World Bank and the OECD. 
- Battle-related deaths (the IV): driven from the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme, this 
variable represents the number of human civilian and military casualties in conflicts. This 
includes warfare with the participation of conventional armed forces, guerrilla, and air 
strikes hitting both civilian and military areas/installations. 
  The use of international institutions’ data when it comes to military expenditure, despite being 
convenient, should always be considered with caution. The caveat here is that countries tend to 
either overstate or understate military budgets for security or mere political reasons. In several 
developing countries undergoing constant conflict threat, a part of some development-focused 
concessional loans or donations provided by international institutions is secretly diverted towards 
purchasing military equipment, which provides a rationale for said countries to understate when 
communicating statistics. Also, overstating military expenditure has a dissuasive effect, 
especially in bipolar regions (e.g. Algeria and Morocco, India and Pakistan, Iran and Saudi 
Arabia…). However, since we use military spending as a share of GDP, this margin of risk is 
minimalised and the data can still provide significant comparative insights. 
  In the gravity model used to explore the exclusion restriction, the focus is shifted towards the 
bilateral level. However, we maintain the same sample of countries for the period between 1989 
and 2014. We exclude the short period between 2014 and 2017 because of missing bilateral data 
for several country-pairs, which would have generated an unbalanced panel. We use data based 
on the CEPII square gravity model, while the bilateral trade flows are collected from the UN 
20 
 
COMTRADE11. The number of bilateral battle-related deaths were taken from the Uppsala 
Conflict Data Programme. 
  In this framework, it is worth observing that the gravity model is confined to interstate battle-
related casualties, because even though there is a few deadly civil wars/insurgencies that were 
allegedly supported by foreign countries, we could not establish the direct link to the supporting 
countries in most cases. Hence, for the sake of research objectivity, we chose to consider only the 
casualties that happened in conflicts directly/officially involving the states of the 77 countries we 
study. The variable includes the number of casualties among civilians and military/paramilitary 
forces, whether the origin country suffered said casualties or dealt them to the other side of the 
conflict (country of destination of the trade flow). 
  Using the methodology and data explained so far, the next section discusses the different results, 
provides different robustness verifications and provides policy implications.  
 
 
 
  
                                                            
11
 The different dummy variables used were constructed by CEPII based on the World Trade Organisation 
information, Baier & Bergstrand (2007), Frankel (1997) and Glick & Rose (2002). 
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IV- RESULTS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
4.1 The baseline model 
  Column 1 of Table 4.1 presents the results of the fixed-effects regression for the overall panel 
with all countries. The model suggests that the military burden is negatively correlated with 
development, with a -0.011 coefficient. The R-squared is fairly significant, i.e. 0.42. Moreover, 
the relationship between GDP per capita and the remaining variables of the equation seem to 
abide by the economic intuition; exports and investment have significantly positive correlation 
coefficients, equal to 0.09 and 0.10 respectively, while the unemployment rate is negatively 
linked to income dynamics, with a small coefficient however. 
  From the outset, this result seems to refute the Benoit hypothesis discussed in the literature 
review above [Benoit (1973, 1978)]. However, deepening the investigation using different 
methods and subpanels should yield further analysis elements. Table 4.2 shows the results 
obtained using the same approach, but with four different income-based groups of countries. The 
relationship between military spending and development appears to be different across income 
subpanels; it is only significant in low-income countries, with a -0.036 coefficient. The non-
significance of the relationship between the two variables in lower middle-, upper middle- and 
high-income countries could be due to the existence of an offsetting combination of positive 
economic spill-overs (e.g. stable political situation, military infrastructure for public use) and 
negative crowding out effects (e.g. less civilian public investment, non-productive military 
equipment imports). When running the regressions with only country-fixed effects for robustness 
(See Appendix 2), the results converge slightly to the main hypotheses of our research, as 
military expenditure shows a decreasing negative influence on GDP per capita when moving 
from lower to higher income level countries. The correlation coefficients are -0.039, -0.019 and -
0.010 in low-income, lower middle-income and upper middle-income economies, respectively. 
The coefficient in high-income countries remains insignificant however, with a positive value of 
0.0018.  
  Another interesting point in Table 4.2 would be related to investment (GFCF), if one assumes 
that its economic effectiveness can be assessed through its correlation coefficient. The latter in 
upper middle-income and high-income countries (respectively 0.177 and 0.152) is the double of 
that in low-income and lower middle-income countries (0.078 and 0.082). This suggests that the 
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former group needs larger investments in order to generate income improvement and 
development in the short run, while the latter need much less. This could be linked to the level of 
infrastructure stock, especially when considering that less developed countries mostly invest in 
infrastructure, which does not generate economic returns in the very short term. Another factor 
could be the inefficiencies linked to the level of corruption12.  On overall, this comparison 
suggests a gradually decreasing incremental capital output ratio (ICOR) as countries become 
more developed.  
  The income-based estimates corroborate the positive relationship between investment and 
exports found earlier in the overall panel, except in the lower middle-income group where the 
coefficient is not statistically significant in both Table 4.2 and Appendix 2. Whereas, the 
unemployment’s correlation coefficients lose significance, with the exception of high-income 
countries, where it keeps its negative sign. These aspects are confirmed in the country-fixed 
effects estimates (without controlling for time-fixed effects) as shown in Appendix 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
12
 For instance, the average of the corruption perception index (CPI) in the group of low-income countries in 2017 
was 30, while it reached 65 among the countries we had chosen for the high-income group. 
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TABLE 4.1: Estimates for all countries using FE and IV [Dependent variable: log GDP 
per capita] 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES FE approach Pooled sample 
with income 
dummy v. 
IV approach 
    𝑀𝐵𝑖𝑡 -0.0109*** -0.0364*** -0.0801*** 
 (0.00366) (0.00681) (0.0256) 𝑀𝐵𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑀𝐶𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖  0.0211**  
  (0.00922)  𝑀𝐵𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑈𝑀𝐶𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖  0.0316***  
  (0.00951)  𝑀𝐵𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝐼𝐶𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖  0.0483***  
  (0.00888)  𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑑  0.0905*** 0.0873*** 0.0993*** 
 (0.00803) (0.00799) (0.00892) 𝐼𝑖𝑡𝑑  0.106*** 0.106*** 0.110*** 
 (0.00543) (0.00538) (0.00611) 𝑈𝑖𝑡 -0.000893** -0.000935** -0.000728* 
 (0.000386) (0.000383) (0.000443) 
Constant 0.0240*** 0.0196*** 0.0655*** 
 (0.00410) (0.00416) (0.0157) 
    
Observations 1,715 1,715 1,715 
R-squared 0.418 0.428  
Number of countryid   71 
 
The IV First-Stage Regression [endogenous variable: the military burden] 𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑠𝑖𝑡   0.0259*** 
   (0.0045) 𝐼𝑖𝑡𝑑    -0.0229 
   (0.0413) 𝑈𝑖𝑡   0.0029 
   (0.00291) 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑑    -0.0341 
   (0.05984) 
Constant   0.5811*** 
   (0.0249) 
    
Observations   1,715 
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  We approach the separation between income groups differently in column 2 of Table 4.1, by 
pooling all countries back together and using dummy variables to make allowance for each 
income category. This approach allows assessing the extent to which the correlation coefficient 
found in the low-income group between the military burden and GDP per capita is independent. 
It also enables further exploration of the relationship between the two variables. The coefficients 
linked to the dummy variables are all significant, which suggests that the effect of the military 
burden on GDP per capita is different across income groups. 
 
TABLE 4.2: Panel fixed-effects estimates in different income groups [Dependent 
variable: log GDP per capita] 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Low income Lower-mid income Upper-mid income High income 
     𝑀𝐵𝑖𝑡 -0.0366*** -0.00278 -0.00529 0.00336 
 (0.0133) (0.00826) (0.00594) (0.00405) 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑑  0.105*** -0.0122 0.113*** 0.185*** 
 (0.0209) (0.0191) (0.0149) (0.0141) 𝐼𝑖𝑡𝑑  0.0779*** 0.0820*** 0.177*** 0.152*** 
 (0.0135) (0.0135) (0.0111) (0.00869) 𝑈𝑖𝑡 -0.000604 0.000803 -0.000577 -0.00176*** 
 (0.00420) (0.00171) (0.000524) (0.000301) 
Constant 0.0275 0.0127 0.0210** 0.0144*** 
 (0.0180) (0.0131) (0.00835) (0.00362) 
     
Observations 221 349 427 718 
R-squared 0.464 0.348 0.623 0.702 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  The results of the pooled panel in column 2 can also be interpreted in terms of impact. Apart 
from that of the low-income countries, the (combined) coefficient linking defence spending to 
GDP per capita in lower-income countries is negative (-0.0364 + 0.0211). It is negative and 
converging toward zero in upper middle-income economies (-0.0364 + 0.0316) and positive for 
high-income ones (-0.0364 + 0.0483). When considering that the more developed is a country the 
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more likely its defence expenditure is linked to production, investment in technology and 
infrastructure, then this finding could support our second hypothesis to a mild extent. The gradual 
improvement of the negative correlation coefficient could be explained by the fact that the 
proportion of productive military expenditure, which yields economic spillovers, varies across the 
four subpanels13.  
  In the low-income economies, the so-far robust negative influence of the military burden could 
be interpreted as the economic consequence of deviating funds that could be used to curb 
development shortages, towards weaponry imports and the purchase of other non-productive 
military equipment and constructions. Whereas, the bulk of (lower and upper) middle-income 
countries do not have productivity-enhancing research/industry either and face development 
challenges as well; this would suggest different results that those generated so far. However, it is 
worth observing that these countries use defence offset contracts as an alternative in order to 
insure technology transfer and foreign investment. The most common form of said offset 
contracts is industrial participation (also called industrial compensation), which is imposed as one 
of the conditions for foreign tenders to be awarded important military procurement contracts. 
This “opportunity cost” involves investment in national non-military industrial sectors, with the 
exception of countertrade for the case of Cuba and Burma –which are not covered by our present 
study. This partly justifies the better coefficients of correlation (insignificant or only slightly 
negative) found in both subcategories of middle-income countries, especially that none of the 
low-income countries (listed in Table 3.1) make use of offset clauses14. 
  In order to test the robustness of the results so far, we examine the results of the instrumental 
variable approach explained in section III above, which should enable to reduce the risk of 
endogeneity. 
  
                                                            
13
 Several examples of defence-related research programmes support this assumption. Among high-income countries, 
several military-sponsored innovation projects have benefited the economy in different fields such as cyber security, 
civil aviation, telecommunications, space exploration and chemical/biological engineering. Military research 
investment takes different forms, ranging from sponsorship of specific university research programmes, to direct 
involvement through agencies such as DARPA in the United States, the Defence Science and Technology 
Laboratory (DSTL) in the United Kingdom, and the VVU in the Czech Republic, etc. Such programmes are 
extremely scarce when examining low-, lower middle-income countries and even a few countries in the upper 
middle-income group studied in this paper. 
14
 International Chamber of Commerce (2019), Annex I, PP. 37-43 
26 
 
 
 
4.2 The gravity model 
  Before analysing the results of the IV model and verifying the instrument’s exogeneity, we first 
discuss the exclusion condition by examining the gravity model estimates. Table 4.3 reports the 
latter, with four different variations. For all four, we use the Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood 
pursuant to the previous discussion in section III. Since the model covers all possible 
combination among the 77 countries, the number of observations used in the regression is 
considerable, i.e. 143,354 observations. 
  In column 1 of the table, we estimate the correlation between interstate battle-related casualties 
and trade flows in a canonical gravity model that includes respective gross domestic products 
(size of the economies) and the weighted distance between countries in each pair. The results 
suggest a very weak negative coefficient of correlation of -0.00009, which is statistically 
significant at the 10% threshold. The coefficient becomes slightly more significant in column 2 (-
0.00016 at 5%) where dummy variables are introduced to control for a number of bilateral 
cultural and geographical aspects, such as the existence of a colonial relationship, a common 
coloniser (post-1945 period), a common religion, a common official language or contiguity. 
However, the deaths coefficient shows no significant impact when including currency and trade 
dummy variables instead (column 3), i.e. common currency, regional/free trade agreements, 
GATT/WTO membership among the countries of origin and destination of the trade flow.  
  In column 4, where all the factors controlled for by dummy variables are included, the 
relationship between battle-related deaths and exports retrieves its statistically significant 
negative sign, yet with a small coefficient of -0.00014.  
  On the other hand, it is worth observing that the main variables of the gravity model (distance 
and GDPs) show a robust stance that is strongly consistent with theory. As regards to the dummy 
variables, it is possible to observe that countries are less likely to trade with others with which 
they shared the same coloniser (largely negative coefficient of correlation between -1.48 and -
1.57), but more likely to trade with their former coloniser (0.234 ; 0.512). Having the same 
official language is not a binding condition; it is the only factor that holds no significant effect on 
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trade. Having a common religion seems have a negative effect on trade in our panel, while the 
rest of the dummy variables show patterns that follow economic intuition. Like the distance and 
GDPs, all the dummy variables maintain similar coefficients with large statistical significance 
regardless of the model’s specification, hence the robustness of the cultural, geographical and 
trade-related factors in determining trade flows dynamics. 
  To sum up, the gravity model estimates suggest that in most cases the existence of bilateral 
conflict casualties could affect trade flows between pairs of countries in a downward course, 
however in a very marginal proportion. This means that there is a risk that battle-related deaths 
could affect GDP per capita if we consider the overwhelming literature on the latter’s positive 
relationship with trade. Therefore, we add the exports variable as an exogenous variable in the 
GDP per capita equation in order to control for this risk that the exclusion restriction could come 
up against otherwise. 
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TABLE 4.3: PPML estimation of the gravity model with battle-related deaths [Dependent variable: 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡] 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Baseline Cultural DV Trade DV All 
Battle-related casualties 𝑍𝑖𝑗𝑡 -0.000092* -0.000161** -0.000018 -0.000141*** 
 (5.04e-05) (6.83e-05) (3.79e-05) (3.01e-05) 
Weighted distance 𝑑𝑖𝑗 -0.000311*** -0.000176*** -0.000160*** -0.0000938*** 
 (7.12e-06) (6.09e-06) (5.08e-06) (4.52e-06) 
GDP of exporter 𝑌𝑖𝑡 3.19e-13*** 2.73e-13*** 2.75e-13*** 2.45e-13*** 
 (3.26e-15) (3.71e-15) (3.94e-15) (3.47e-15) 
GDP of importer 𝑌𝑗𝑡 3.34e-13*** 2.89e-13*** 2.90e-13*** 2.61e-13*** 
 (3.44e-15) (3.80e-15) (4.25e-15) (3.70e-15) 
Colonial relationship  0.234***  0.512*** 
  (0.0415)  (0.0406) 
Common colonizer (post 1945)  -1.485***  -1.573*** 
  (0.0868)  (0.0802) 
Common religion  -0.120**  -0.546*** 
  (0.0483)  (0.0457) 
Common official or primary language  -0.0549  -0.0490 
  (0.0449)  (0.0353) 
Contiguity  1.843***  1.472*** 
  (0.0486)  (0.0460) 
Common currency   0.972*** 1.100*** 
   (0.0738) (0.0499) 
RTA   1.294*** 1.095*** 
   (0.0338) (0.0325) 
Exporter is GATT/WTO member   0.853*** 0.833*** 
   (0.0435) (0.0423) 
Importer is GATT/WTO member   1.169*** 1.152*** 
   (0.0402) (0.0386) 
Constant 20.74*** 20.08*** 17.81*** 17.64*** 
 (0.0320) (0.0368) (0.0592) (0.0582) 
Observations 143,354 143,354 143,354 143,354 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
4.3 The instrumental variable approach: robustness analysis 
  After discussing the results of the baseline fixed-effects regression and the gravity model’s 
implications, we turn to estimating Equation (2) which motivates battle-related deaths as an 
instrumental variable for the military burden. 
  Column 3 of Table 4.1 reports the results for the overall panel. With comparison to column 1, 
it seems that introducing the effect of the number of conflict casualties through military burden 
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reveals a slightly more negative impact of the latter on development in the short run. The 𝑀𝐵𝑖𝑡 
coefficient of correlation goes from -0.011 (Fixed-effects) to -0.08. The remaining exogenous 
variables of the equation maintain similar coefficients, at 0.0993, 0.11 and -0.00073 for 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑑, 𝐼𝑖𝑡𝑑  
and 𝑈𝑖𝑡 respectively. 
  In the first-stage regression results reported in the second part of Table 4.1, the exogeneity 
condition is established. The instrumental variable battle-related deaths is significantly correlated 
with the endogenous variable at the 1% threshold according to the t test, with a positive 
coefficient of 0.0259. 
  This logic is confirmed when subdividing the panel into income-based groups. The instrumental 
variable approach ascertains the robustness of the previous results, as in Table 4.4 the military 
burden’s coefficient is only significantly negative in low-income countries, at -0.0965. Again, 
this coefficient is merely slightly larger than the one estimated in the baseline fixed-effects 
model. Said coefficient loses its statistical significance in lower middle-, upper middle- and high-
income economies, in a similar pattern to that reported in Table 4.2 above. The robustness of the 
model is also supported when examining the coefficients of the other exogenous variables. 
Across columns 1 to 4 in Table 4.4, the different coefficients related to export, investment and 
unemployment show similar values and t test results compared to those generated by the basic 
fixed-effects model above. 
  An important observation, when examining the first-stage regression, is the statistically non-
significant correlation between battle-related deaths and the military burden in high-income 
countries, reported in the first-stage regression part of column 4. This suggests that the 
instrumental variable’s exogeneity condition is not respected, hence a weak predictor of the 
endogenous variable for that category of countries. This outcome is plausible, particularly when 
bearing in mind that in several conflicts during the 1989-2017 period, most rich countries that 
took part in global combats have not suffered human casualties among their personnel or in their 
sovereign territory. This is partly because these countries have been mostly engaged through 
intelligence and air strikes in foreign warfare theatres. In other words, on one hand, military 
spending was increasing but, on the other, the number of deaths (among said rich countries) were 
not affected due to the reduced-risk nature of their interventions, made possible by their military 
superiority. Historical data-based facts provide support for this explanation, e.g. several battles in 
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the early 1990s Persian Gulf War where the US-led international coalition massively used 
(costly) aviation and armoured ground forces to swiftly defeat the Iraqi army. Consequently, 
Canada, France and the US had zero registered deaths while Britain suffered 67 human casualties 
between 1990 and 199115. On the other hand, the death toll on the Iraqi side (upper middle-
income country) reached 23,038 people in 1991 alone. Similar dynamics are also observed in 
recent conflicts such as the ongoing Operation Decisive Storm in Yemen, launched in 2015 by a 
nine-country coalition led by Saudi Arabia (high-income country). 
  However, the exogeneity condition is respected in all the other income subpanels. The strongest 
correlation between the instrument and the endogenous variable is found among low-income 
countries, at +0.0684. The coefficient is at +0.0377 in the upper middle-income group. Both 
coefficients are significant at the 1% threshold, according to their respective t test results. In the 
case of lower middle-income countries, as shown in the first-stage regression part of column 2, 
the coefficient is largely significant yet negative (-0.051). While there is no certain explanation of 
this puzzling correlation sign, one cannot discard the possibility that it might be linked to one of 
the limits of the data as discussed in section III above (subsection 3.3). Some developing 
countries undergoing constant conflict threat supposedly have the tendency to understate their 
military expenditure statistics because of partial deviations of development-oriented concessional 
loans or donations towards purchasing military equipment, or simply for tactical reasons. This 
explanation is more likely in light of the results we found when lagging the variables to check for 
whether military spending increases as a post-hostility reaction or pre-conflict preparation in 
lower middle-income countries. These last two scenarios are refuted, as even after running the 
same regression with different combinations of lagged variables, the negative coefficient remains 
very robust. 
 
  
                                                            
15
 The statistics are based on the Uppsala Conflict Data Program. 
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TABLE 4.4: IV estimates and first stage regression results by income groups [Dependent var.: 
GDP per capita] 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Low income Lower-mid income Upper-mid income High income 
     𝑀𝐵𝑖𝑡 -0.0965*** 0.0864 0.00528 0.0641 
 (0.0283) (0.0634) (0.0269) (0.0792) 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑑  0.0968*** 0.00809 0.129*** 0.187*** 
 (0.0219) (0.0229) (0.0147) (0.0322) 𝐼𝑖𝑡𝑑  0.0751*** 0.0965*** 0.184*** 0.166*** 
 (0.0135) (0.0167) (0.0111) (0.0152) 𝑈𝑖𝑡 -0.00293 -0.000624 -0.000759 -0.00193*** 
 (0.00349) (0.00215) (0.000521) (0.000570) 
Constant 0.0682*** -0.0253 0.0131 -0.0210 
 (0.0240) (0.0334) (0.0227) (0.0426) 
     
Observations 221 349 427 718 
Number of countries 12 14 16 29 
 
First Stage Regression [endogenous variable: the military burden] 
 
 𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑠𝑖𝑡 0.06839*** -0.0514*** 0.03772*** 0.0183 
 (0.01045) (0.0181) (0.00862) (0.0144) 𝐼𝑖𝑡𝑑  0.002926 0.0297 -0.08138 -0.135 
 (0.0730) (0.0925) (0.0948) (0.105) 𝑈𝑖𝑡 -0.0295 0.0131 0.00013 0.0052 
 (0.0181) (0.01199) (0.0044) (0.00367) 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑑  -0.09495 -0.0409 -0.0543 0.3653** 
 (0.1148) (0.1275) (0.12512) (0.1480) 
Constant 0.5422*** 0.6956*** 0.0377*** 0.5351*** 
 (0.0819) (0.1234) (0.0532) (0.0302) 
     
Observations 221 349 427 718 
Number of countries 12 14 16 29 
 
  In order to verify if the IV model is soundly identified, we use a group of tests. The results of 
the latter are reported in Table 4.5 for both the overall panel and the income-based subdivided 
analysis.  
  To test for under- or weak identification of the instrumental variable, we use the Anderson 
canonical correlation LM statistic, the Cragg-Donald Wald test and the Sanderson-Windmeijer F 
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test. The null hypothesis for all three tests is weak/under-identification, but they test for it through 
different indicators, e.g. concentration matrix, the minimum canonical correlation. We also test 
the significance of the endogenous variable in the main equation, using the Anderson-Rubin 
Wald test and the Stock-Wright LM S statistic. Here, the null hypothesis is that the endogenous 
variable’s coefficient is equal to zero and that orthogonality condition apply. We also include the 
Hansen J statistic as an over-identification test, mostly for pedagogical purposes. However, it is 
worth mentioning that the Hansen J statistic is not quite relevant to this study, because it only 
effectively analyses over-identification after the introduction of a second instrumental variable or 
more; yet we only use one instrument. Ergo, its outcome in our case is interpreted as “equation 
exactly identified” for all panels. Following this logic, we also skip the Angrist-Pischke test, 
since we only have one instrument/regressor anyway, hence no need for further individual 
investigation through AP first-stage F statistics. 
 
TABLE 4.5: IV identification tests for the overall panel and income-based groups 
 Low 
income 
Lower-mid 
income 
Upper-mid 
income High income 
All 
countries TESTS 
      
Anderson canonical corr. LM stat 36.11 7.96 18.45 1.63 32.48 
P-value (0.0000) (0.0187) (0.0000) (0.2019) (0.0000) 
Interpretation [Identified] [Identified] [Identified] [Under-identified] [Identified] 
 
     
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 42.82 4.02 19.13 1.62 33.05 
Interpretation [Identified] [Under-identified] [Identified] [Under-identified] [Identified] 
 
     
Anderson-Rubin Wald test (Chi-sq) 13.41 4.28 0.04 1.07 12.22 
P-value (0.0003) (0.1179) (0.8429) (0.3015) (0.0005) 
Interpretation [Significant] [Non-significant] [Non-significant] [Non-significant] [Significant] 
 
     
Stock-Wright LM S statistic (Chi-sq) 12.60 4.22 0.04 1.07 12.13 
P-value (0.0004) (0.1211) (0.8429) (0.3019) (0.0005) 
Interpretation [Significant] [Non-significant] [Non-significant] [Non-significant] [Significant] 
 
     
Hansen J statistic P-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
Sanderson-Windmeijer F test  
 
42.82 
 
4.02 
 
19.13  
 
1.62 
 
33.05 
P-value 0.0000 0.0189 0.0000 0.2032 0.0000 
 
     
Observations 221 349 427 718 1715 
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  The aforementioned tests confirm that the instrument was soundly selected for the overall panel 
with all countries (column 5 of Table 4.5), as the null hypotheses of the Anderson canonical 
correlation LM test, the Sanderson-Windmeijer F test and the Cragg-Donald Wald F test are 
rejected at the 1% threshold, which implies proper identification. Moreover, the results of the 
Anderson-Rubin Wald test and the Stock-Wright LM S statistic suggest that the military burden’s 
coefficient is significant in the GDP per capita equation (i.e. second-stage regression). The last 
two tests are in line with the results in column 3 of Table 4.1 discussed above.  
  The identification tests corroborate the IV approach results for the case of high-income 
countries. The variable battle-related deaths is evidently not a suitable instrument for the military 
burden in this category of countries, as the null hypotheses related to both under-identification 
and statistical non-significance were accepted in all the different tests. In the low- and upper 
middle-income subpanels, the identification tests suggest that the instrumental variable is not 
weak. In lower middle-income countries, the Anderson canonical correlation LM test, the 
Sanderson-Windmeijer F test and the Cragg-Donald Wald F test send contrasted signals. The 
former and the second reject the null hypothesis of under-specification at the 5% threshold while 
the latter accepts it when confronting its F statistic (4.02) with the Stock-Yogo weak ID test 
critical values on all possible maximal IV size thresholds (10%, 15%, 20% and 25%). This 
finding gives further rationale for the scepticism expressed above after finding a negative 
correlation between the number of battle-related deaths and the military burden (column 2 of 
Table 4.4). It compels to take with larger caution the results found for this category of countries 
and, again, the abovementioned risks regarding military data reporting in this subpanel should not 
be discarded. 
  Across all four income-based subpanels, the Anderson-Rubin and Stock-Wright tests suggest 
that the coefficient of the endogenous variable in the main equation is only significant in low-
income countries. This could be interpreted as further robustness to the baseline model, which 
yields similar results. These findings confirm to some extent the first hypothesis developed in this 
paper, i.e. it is in the low-income countries that the influence on output and development is 
supposed to be negative, as those countries development shortages are the most severe and 
military spending is merely linked to counterproductive expenses and imports of weapons. The 
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identification tests confirm that the military burden is tightly connected to deaths-generating 
conflicts in this category of countries, while the second-stage regression results insinuate the 
existence of a crowding out effect on development (as proxied by GDP per capita).  
4.4 Further robustness and potential extensions 
  Applicability with regional subpanels: In Appendix 3, we disaggregate the panel differently. We 
classify countries by geographical locations and apply the instrumental variable methodology. 
We shed light on six regions, i.e. Sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East and North Africa (MENA), 
Europe and Russia (Europe), South-East Asia and Australia (SE Asia), Latin America (Latin 
Am.) and North America (North Am.). The latter only includes Canada and the USA, as Mexico 
is included in Latin America. The results confirm to a large extent the robustness of the negative 
correlation between the military burden and development in low-income countries, since they 
make the most of Sub-Saharan Africa16. 
  The exogeneity of the instrument battle-related deaths is also confirmed for this region, 
alongside Latin America and Europe. The instrument seems not to be valid for North America, 
South-East Asia and MENA. The last two regions are very heterogeneous, made of low- (Syria 
and Yemen), middle- and high-income, which could explain why the instrument’s coefficient is 
indecisive in the first-stage regression. As for North America, the same explanation given for 
high-income countries in Table 4.4 would apply. 
  We also try different varieties and extensions of the model developed so far, to further test its 
robustness and to potentially uncover additional analysis elements. In Appendix 4, we replace 
overall investment (GFCF) with private investment as a robustness check, which could also 
reduce any risks of unobservable interconnections within government budgets that could 
influence the public contribution of GFCF (collinearity). Here, we notice that the coefficient of 
private investment loses its significance when estimating the equation with the instrumental 
variable approach, as opposed to that of GFCF in Table 4.1 above, where the value stays 
consistent in the [0.106;0.110] range. Most importantly, the correlation between the military 
burden and GDP per capita keeps its negative sign in both the baseline and IV models under this 
configuration, thereby corroborating the robustness of the findings for the overall panel.  
                                                            
16
 A part from Syria and Yemen, all low-income countries examined in this study are in Sub-Saharan Africa (see 
Table 3.1). 
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  Another possible extension would be to reason in terms of military personnel instead of military 
burden. This spin-off should provide insights on whether it is only military capital spending that 
influences per capita GDP growth or does staffing also play a role. In order to enable 
comparability, we opt for share values as argued by several economists [e.g. Kollias et al. (2004), 
Dunne & Perlo-Freeman (2005)]. Thus, the variable used in this alternative variety of our model 
is military personnel as a proportion of the labour force. The table in Appendix 5 reports the 
results using the baseline fixed-effects model for the overall panel and income-based subpanels. 
From the outset, a striking difference emerges, i.e. the absence of a significant relationship 
between the army personnel and GDP per capita in the inclusive panel, unlike the robust negative 
coefficient linked to the military burden. This supports to some extent that, when considering all 
countries, staffing does not crowd out growth and development. Rather, equipment expenditure 
seem to have a larger influence on that front. The second interesting outcome is the negative 
coefficient associated with military personnel in low-income countries. The large proportion of 
soldiers (and potentially other non-fighting military staff) in LDCs hints atypically low costs. The 
latter are considered by Collier and Hoeffler (2004) as a determinant of the likelihood of conflict, 
because when the income foregone by enlisting a military staff member is unusually low, the 
opportunities of a conflict appear much higher17. This logic applies to both civil and interstate 
conflicts. Here, there is a risk of omitted variable bias, since it could be the expectation or 
existence of (interstate or civil) conflict combined with low cost of fighters that would 
simultaneously drive an upward impact on the military personnel proportions and a downward 
influence on development through asset destruction and economic instability. When using the 
instrument battle-related deaths to control for this risk, the negative correlation disappears. 
However, the exogeneity condition is not established for the military personnel in all panels, 
which means that the results are actually not reliable and that no claim should be motivated based 
on the IV approach in this very case. This spinoff emphasises the adequacy of our initial model 
(both baseline and IV robustness check) where endogeneity risks are minimised. 
  In light of the robustness of the negative macroeconomic of military variables in low-income 
countries through all model varieties and spinoffs, one major policy recommendation would be 
the improvement of the productivity of their military investment. One way of doing so could be 
by introducing industrial offset contracts in defence procurement in order to insure a channel of 
                                                            
17
 Collier and Hoeffler (2004), P. 569 
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technology transfer and investment, like middle- and high-income countries. This aspect is 
important considering that none of the low-income countries examined in this study adopts such 
measures. 
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V. CONCLUSION AND LIMITS 
  This research paper evaluated the effect of military expenditure on development (GDP per 
capita) in a panel encompassing countries from different regions and income groups. In this 
endeavour, we initially used a baseline fixed-effects panel data model. Following this approach, a 
few robustness exercises followed, mainly through an instrumental variable estimation and by 
pooling the data with the use of dummy variables. And in order to explore the validity of that 
relationship depending on the countries, we break the panel into different subpanels based on 
economic characteristics and category of each group of countries, namely income and geography. 
  The baseline fixed-effects model estimates show a negative correlation between the military 
burden and development. When breaking down the panel into income subpanels, the downward 
influence of military expenditure is observable in low-income countries only. When dividing the 
panel into regional groups, the results still extensively confirm the robustness of the negative 
correlation between the military burden and development in low-income countries, since they 
make the most of Sub-Saharan Africa –i.e. the only group where a negative coefficient is 
reported. The same evidence is corroborated when using the IV approach for the inclusive panel 
and the income-based subpanels. 
  These findings challenge the Benoit hypothesis, initially inducted based on LDC data. However, 
the idiosyncrasies of each era should be taken into account, considering that the characteristics of 
LDCs and the prerequisites of development are unlikely to be identical in the 1950-1965 [Benoit 
(1973, 1978)] and the 1989-2017 [present study] periods. In fact, the countries that are still in the 
LDC pool up to today are the least efficient institutionally and economically, and home to 
conflicts and instability [Collier (2007)]. 
  The empirical evidence harvested through this research work provides robust support for our 
first hypothesis, which states that in the low-income countries, where development shortages are 
the most severe and military spending is merely linked to counterproductive expenses and 
imports of weapons, the influence of military spending is supposed to be negative. Conversely, 
only a few hints were drawn in support of the second hypothesis regarding the potential 
technology spill-overs (e.g. the fixed-effects pooled panel with income-based dummy variables) 
while most of the results do not show any significant positive correlation for that matter. The 
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non-significance of the relationship between the two variables in lower middle-, upper middle- 
and high-income countries could be seen as the existence of a potential offsetting combination of 
positive economic spill-overs (e.g. stable political situation, military infrastructure for public use) 
and negative crowding out effects (e.g. less civilian public investment, non-productive military 
equipment imports). But as far as statistics go, this interpretation remains hypothetical. 
  The choice of battle-related deaths as an instrumental variable showed to be best suitable for 
low-income countries, where the exogeneity condition is robust. It also fits upper middle-income 
countries. On the other hand, lower middle-income countries show a counter-intuitive 
relationship between the number of deaths and military spending, and the instrumental variable 
choice is not robust, as the two under-specification tests (Anderson and Cragg-Donald) show 
contrasted results. This suggests a relatively weak instrument in this category of countries as 
well. As for high-income countries, the exogeneity condition is consistently not established, 
which is possibly tributary to the fact that in several conflicts during the 1989-2017 period, most 
rich countries that took part in global combats have not suffered human casualties among their 
personnel or in their sovereign territory. This is partly because these countries have been mostly 
engaged through intelligence and air strikes in foreign warfare theatres. 
  In terms of policy, one major recommendation would be the improvement of the productivity of 
low-income countries’ military investments, in light of their robust negative macroeconomic 
effect through all model varieties and spinoffs. One way of doing so could be by introducing 
industrial offset contracts in defence procurement in order to insure a channel of technology 
transfer and investment, like middle- and high-income countries. This aspect is important 
considering that none of the low-income countries examined in this study adopts such measures. 
  Like any study examining multidimensional phenomena such the war-economy nexus, this 
study has several limits, including the possibility of endogeneity. Despite the arguments 
regarding the lack of military expenditure’s productivity among low-income countries compared 
to better performing economies (e.g. absence of research programmes, offsets-driven technology 
transfers or industrial compensation…), one cannot either deny that a large number of the deadly 
conflicts that took place from 1989 to 2017 occurred geographically in LDCs. When considering 
the conflict theatre (location), it is possible to argue for other factors influencing GDP per capita. 
Such factors could include the deterioration of infrastructure due to airstrikes, the high political 
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and economic instability or the drastic movements of the population and their direct impact on 
production. Sending troops or sponsoring militia in a different country certainly does not have the 
same economic impact as being on the receiving end. These factors are at least as much influent 
and plausible as the ones presented in this study, hence the risk of endogeneity. Therefore, future 
research work should shed light on this particular matter. 
  Another significant limit would be the short-term perspective of this research paper. A further 
analysis should consider long-term impact on development, especially that the latter supposedly 
requires longer periods of time to reveal its full extent. Future studies are also encouraged to 
investigate the potentially non-linear relationship between development and private investment 
on one hand, and military spending on the other. Emphasis should be laid on testing the existence 
of a threshold (in GDP proportion) beyond which the effect becomes negative.  
  Seen their allegedly important role through the discussion, a formal study of the impact of 
defence offset contracts on FDI and productivity would be a sound alternative route for research. 
The challenging part here would be gathering data for several countries. However, a quantitative 
analysis of this relationship is decidedly novel and should provide further insights in terms of 
policy implications, especially among middle-income countries where the trade-off between 
military and development expenditures is constantly present. 
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APPENDIX 1: The Hausman test results 
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APPENDIX 2: Income subpanels regressions with only country-fixed effects [Y: log GDP per 
capita] 
 
 
 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Low income Lower-mid income Upper-mid income High income 
     𝑀𝐵𝑖𝑡 -0.0395*** -0.0194** -0.0104* 0.00181 
 (0.0111) (0.00786) (0.00565) (0.00303) 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑑 0.110*** 0.00621 0.129*** 0.210*** 
 (0.0198) (0.0184) (0.0145) (0.0118) 𝐼𝑖𝑡𝑑  0.0751*** 0.0988*** 0.184*** 0.157*** 
 (0.0127) (0.0134) (0.0110) (0.00840) 𝑈𝑖𝑡 -0.000933 9.21e-05 -0.000706 -0.00159*** 
 (0.00318) (0.00169) (0.000509) (0.000291) 
Constant 0.0302* 0.0244* 0.0259*** 0.0125*** 
 (0.0157) (0.0127) (0.00767) (0.00290) 
     
Observations 221 349 427 718 
R-squared 0.378 0.216 0.565 0.676 
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APPENDIX 3: IV model estimates in regional subpanels [Y: log GDP per capita] 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Sub-Saharan Africa MENA Europe SE Asia Latin Am. North Am. 
       𝑀𝐵𝑖𝑡 -0.119*** 0.0736 0.00114 -1.604 -0.0211 -0.0453 
 (0.0427) (0.168) (0.0380) (5.266) (0.0146) (0.0870) 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑑  0.0868*** 0.126*** 0.123*** 0.628 0.102*** 0.169** 
 (0.0176) (0.0295) (0.0137) (2.293) (0.0216) (0.0678) 𝐼𝑖𝑡𝑑  0.0618*** 0.129*** 0.228*** 0.109 0.189*** 0.151* 
 (0.0101) (0.0251) (0.00935) (0.598) (0.0113) (0.0881) 𝑈𝑖𝑡 -0.00167 1.53e-05 -0.0008** -0.0140 -0.00162** 0.00123 
 (0.00180) (0.000935) (0.000377) (0.0494) (0.000814) (0.00690) 
Constant 0.0862*** -0.106 0.0150 0.989 0.0238*** 0.0286 
 (0.0305) (0.246) (0.0199) (3.182) (0.00416) (0.0197) 
       
Observations 440 236 547 213 225 54 
Number of countryid 21 10 21 8 9 2 
 
First Stage Regression [endogenous variable: the military burden] 
 𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑠𝑖𝑡 0.0323*** 0.00897 0.031** 0.0027 0.0645*** -0.0171 
 (0.000) (0.337) (0.020) (0.765) (0.000) (0.309) 𝐼𝑖𝑡𝑑  0.0868*** 0.0551 -0.024 -0.095 0.2106 -0.9568*** 
 (0.0176) (0.693) (0.820) (0.623) (0.190) (0.002) 𝑈𝑖𝑡 -0.0076 -0.004 0.0002 -0.0093 0.0341*** 0.0783*** 
 (0.458) (0.430) (0.950) (0.522) (0.000) (0.000) 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑑  -0.1486 0.0879 0.0958 0.432*** -0.5608* 0.651** 
 (0.100) (0.578) (0.519) (0.009) (0.068) (0.029) 
Constant 0.5571*** 1.461*** 0.4991*** 0.604*** -0.0588 0.2257*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.355) (0.001) 
       
Observations 440 236 547 213 225 54 
Number of countryid 21 10 21 8 9 2 
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APPENDIX 4: Baseline and IV estimates with private investment [Y: log GDP per capita] 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES IV FE 
   𝑀𝐵𝑖𝑡 -0.0905** -0.0125** 
 (0.0383) (0.00635) 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑑  0.124*** 0.123*** 
 (0.0142) (0.0125) 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐼𝑖𝑡 0.00894 0.0177*** 
 (0.00866) (0.00633) 𝑈𝑖𝑡 0.00235* 0.00140 
 (0.00136) (0.00111) 
Constant 0.0341 -0.0387* 
 (0.0436) (0.0208) 
   
Observations 820 820 
R-squared  0.270 
 
The IV First-Stage Regression [endogenous variable: the military burden] 
 𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑠𝑖𝑡 0.02993***  
 (0.0000)  𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐼𝑖𝑡 -0.12038***  
 (0.001)  𝑈𝑖𝑡 0.015**  
 (0.024)  𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑑  -0.104  
 (0.164)  
Constant 0.8974***  
 (0.0000)  
   
Observations 820  
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
  
47 
 
APPENDIX 5: FE model estimates with military personnel [Y: log GDP per capita] 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES All Low-income Lower-mid 
income 
Upper-mid 
income 
High-income 
      𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑡 -0.00486 -0.0219** 0.00793 -0.00583 -0.00148 
 (0.00299) (0.00939) (0.0102) (0.00528) (0.00247) 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑑 0.111*** 0.135*** 0.00639 0.130*** 0.206*** 
 (0.00789) (0.0198) (0.0179) (0.0146) (0.0117) 𝐼𝑖𝑡𝑑  0.0934*** 0.0566*** 0.0927*** 0.185*** 0.154*** 
 (0.00509) (0.0112) (0.0135) (0.0110) (0.00829) 𝑈𝑖𝑡 -0.00118*** -0.00122 0.000187 -0.000689 -0.00159*** 
 (0.000400) (0.00333) (0.00170) (0.000512) (0.000299) 
Constant 0.0191*** -0.00863 0.0148 0.0204*** 0.0142*** 
 (0.00337) (0.0153) (0.0126) (0.00671) (0.00242) 
      
Observations 1,751 234 355 427 735 
R-squared 0.357 0.348 0.197 0.563 0.664 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
